Abstract. We present new candidates for quantum-resistant public-key cryptosystems based on the conjectured difficulty of finding isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves. The main technical idea in our scheme is that we transmit the images of torsion bases under the isogeny in order to allow the two parties to arrive at a common shared key despite the noncommutativity of the endomorphism ring. Our work is motivated by the recent development of a subexponential-time quantum algorithm for constructing isogenies between ordinary elliptic curves. In the supersingular case, by contrast, the fastest known quantum attack remains exponential, since the noncommutativity of the endomorphism ring means that the approach used in the ordinary case does not apply. We give a precise formulation of the necessary computational assumption along with a discussion of its validity. In addition, we present implementation results showing that our protocols are multiple orders of magnitude faster than previous isogeny-based cryptosystems over ordinary curves.
Introduction
The Diffie-Hellman scheme is a fundamental protocol for public-key exchange between two parties. Its original definition over finite fields is based on the hardness of computing the map g, g a , g b → g ab for g ∈ F * p , while its elliptic curve analogue depends on the difficulty of computing P, aP, bP → abP for points P on an elliptic curve. Recently, Stolbunov [19] proposed a Diffie-Hellman type system based on the difficulty of computing isogenies between ordinary elliptic curves, with the stated aim of obtaining quantum-resistant cryptographic protocols. The fastest known (classical) probabilistic algorithm for solving this problem is the algorithm of Galbraith and Stolbunov [9] , based on the algorithm of Galbraith, Hess, and Smart [8] Childs et al. [5] has shown that the private keys in Stolbunov's system can be recovered in subexponential time. Moreover, even if we only consider classical attacks in assessing security levels, Stolbunov's scheme requires 229 seconds (even with precomputation) to perform a single key exchange operation at the 128-bit security level on a desktop PC [19, Table 1 ].
In this work we present isogeny-based cryptosystems that address both the performance and security drawbacks of Stolbunov's system. Our scheme achieves performance on the order of one second (cf. Section 6) at the 128-bit security level (as measured against the fastest known quantum attacks) using desktop PCs, making it far faster than Stolbunov's scheme. In terms of security, our scheme is not vulnerable to the algorithm of Childs et al. [5] , nor to any algorithm of this type, since it is not based on a group action. The fastest known attacks against our scheme, even on quantum computers, require fully exponential time. Our scheme involves a new computational assumption upon which its quantum resistance is based, and like all new computational assumptions, further study and the passage of time is needed for validation. Nevertheless, we believe our proposal represents a promising candidate for quantum-resistant isogeny-based public-key cryptography.
Our proposal uses isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves rather than ordinary elliptic curves. The main technical difficulty is that, in the supersingular case, the endomorphism ring is noncommutative, whereas Diffie-Hellman type protocols require commutativity. We show how to overcome this obstacle by providing the outputs of the isogeny on certain points as auxiliary input to the protocol. To the best of our knowledge, nothing similar to this idea has ever previously appeared in the literature. Providing this auxiliary input does not seem to make the problem of finding isogenies any easier; see Section 5.2 for a full discussion. The multiple orders of magnitude of performance gains in our scheme arise from the fact that supersingular isogeny graphs are much faster to navigate than ordinary graphs. In Section 5.1 we provide formal statements of the hardness assumptions and security reductions for our system. Finally, in Section 6 we present implementation results confirming the correctness and performance of our protocol.
Isogenies
Let E 1 and E 2 be elliptic curves defined over a finite field F q . An isogeny φ : E 1 → E 2 defined over F q is a non-constant rational map defined over F q which is also a group homomorphism from E 1 (F q ) to E 2 (F q ) [15, III.4] . The degree of an isogeny is its degree as a rational map. For separable isogenies, to have degree means to have kernel of size . Every isogeny of degree greater than 1 can be factored into a composition of isogenies of prime degree overF q [6] .
An endomorphism of an elliptic curve E defined over F q is an isogeny E → E defined over F q m for some m. The set of endomorphisms of E together with the zero map forms a ring under the operations of pointwise addition and composition; this ring is called the endomorphism ring of E and denoted End(E). The
